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In an iterated two-person game, for instance prisoners dilemma or the snowdrift game, there
exist strategies that force the payoffs of the opponents to be equal. These equalizer strategies
form a subset of the more general zero-determinant strategies that unilaterally set the payoff of an
opponent. A challenge in the attempts to understand the role of these strategies in the evolution of
animal behavior is the lack of iterations in the fights for mating opportunities or territory control.
We show that an arbitrary two-parameter strategy may possess a corresponding equalizer strategy
which produces the same result: statistics of the fight outcomes in the contests with mutants are the
same for each of these two strategies. Therefore, analyzing only the equalizer strategy space may be
sufficient to predict animal behavior if nature, indeed, reduces (marginalizes) complex strategies to
equalizer strategy space. The work’s main finding is that there is a unique equalizer strategy that
predicts fight outcomes without mutual cooperation. The lack of mutual cooperation is a common
trait in conflict escalation contests that generally require a clear winner. In addition this unique
strategy does not assess information of the opponent’s state. The method bypasses the standard
analysis of evolutionary stability. The results fit well the observations of combat between male bowl
and doily spiders and support an empirical assumption of the war of attrition model that the species
use only information regarding their own state during conflict escalation.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Animals fight for mating opportunities and territory
control[1]. The contest, generally, proceeds as a contin-
uous fight or a series of aggressive encounters until one
of the competitors either dies or flees. The winner gains
a resource that contributes to its Darwinian fitness. The
field studies of animal combats pose a theoretical chal-
lenge to predict observed strategies for fights as a func-
tion of the observed evolutionary payoffs[2]. For instance,
what are the payoffs that cause the spices to assess (mu-
tual assessment) or to discard (self assessment) informa-
tion regarding their opponent during the fight[3–7]?
Two-person games, e.g. prisoner’s dilemma or the
snowdrift game, constitute a well-established framework
for analyzing evolutionarily optimal behavior[8–13]. In a
two-person game, players adopt either of the two distinct
behavior roles. We will use a defector D and a cooperator
C as standard notations of the roles. There are four pos-
sible outcomes for a single round of the game between
players h (host) and m (mutant): (CC,CD,DC,DD)
where both players cooperate, h cooperates while m de-
fects, h defects while m cooperates, and where both play-
ers defect. The payoffs of player h are:
~W (h) = (R,S, T, P ), (1)
for the outcomes (CC,CD,DC,DD), respectively.
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The type of game depends on its payoffs (1)[14]. Pris-
oner’s dilemma T > R > P > S severely punishes co-
operation C with a defector D: the minimal payoff is
S for the outcome CD. In conflict escalation, e.g. the
snowdrift games T > R > S > P , mutual defection DD
claims a heavy price from both sides similar to a compe-
tition of two cars that race toward each other. In this ar-
ticle, conflict escalation is defined as R > S > P, T > S.
This definition includes the snowdrift game (which favors
defection against a cooperator DC) and a similar game
that may favor mutual cooperation CC.
The gain G(h,m) of a player h against m is:
G(h,m) = ~Ω(h,m) ~W (h), (2)
where vector ~Ω(h,m):
~Ω(h,m) = (ΩCC ,ΩCD,ΩDC ,ΩDD), (3)
defines the probabilities of the outcomes
(CC,CD,DC,DD) in a competition between play-
ers h and m, while ~W (h) defines the corresponding
payoffs (1) of h. The probabilities of the outcomes
~Ω(h,m) depends on the strategies of the competitors h
and m to choose their roles.
It has become a common choice to use memory-one
strategies {sM1} as a set of possible strategies to play a
two-person game[13, 15, 16]. Under the assumption of
repeated rounds of the game, an iterated strategy com-
prises four independent probabilities:
sM1 = (pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD), (4)
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2to cooperate if the outcome of the previous round of the
game was (CC,CD,DC,DD), respectively. Memory-
one strategies {sM1} form a subset of memory-N strate-
gies {sMN } that depend on N previous rounds of the
game[17].
Some memory-one strategies possess the most peculiar
properties[14, 18, 19]. For instance, an equalizer strategy
sEQM1 = (pCC , pDD) with the probabilities pCD and pDC :
pCD =
pCC(T − P )− (1 + pDD)(T −R)
R− P ,
pDC =
(1− pCC)(P − S) + pDD(R− S)
R− P , (5)
causes the payoffs of all the opponents to be equal to each
other:
G(sM1 , s
EQ
M1
) = const, (6)
for any memory-one strategy sM1 (the gain, however, de-
pends on sEQM1 )[14, 18]. Recently, there has been consider-
able interest[13, 20–23] in more general zero-determinant
(ZD) strategies[19] that unilaterally set a gain (2) for the
opponents.
A complex strategy may be reduced to a simple one:
for instance, a memory-one strategy marginalizes any
memory-N strategy. The shortest-memory player sets the
outcome probabilities of a game:〈
Ωx,y|H0,H1
〉
H0,H1
=
〈
Ωx,y|H0
〉
H0
, (7)
where Ωx,y is a probability for specific outcome of a fight
(x and y take the values C or D), while H0 and H1 rep-
resent the histories of the game available to the first and
the second players correspondingly (see eq. (18) of Ap-
pendix A in [19]). Eq. (7) does not limited to memory-N
strategies, because the variables H0 and H1 can represent
any information that affects the decisions of the players.
Memory-one strategies are probably the most stud-
ied ones and are constantly in the focus of recent
research[13]. Much uncertainty still exists about the im-
pact of memory-one strategies on the evolution of ani-
mal contests. The obstacle in applying these strategies
to field observations is that many mating or territory
control combats lack repeated rounds, though there are
some exceptions[24]. To the best of our knowledge, it is
still not known whether marginalization (7) takes place
in nature[25].
An example of a contest without repeated rounds in
nature is the mating combat of male bowl and doily
spiders[26]. According to S. Austad, upon reaching ma-
turity, specimens of male bowl and doily spiders compete
with each other for access to a female’s web in order to
fertilize her eggs. The fight between two males proceeds
as a series of aggressive grapples until one of the com-
petitors either receives a severe injury and dies or flees
to search for other mating opportunities. The winner
gains access to the web. Each fight has a winner: spi-
ders never cooperate to share the eggs of a web. The
Darwinian payoffs of a spider are well-represented by the
amount of inseminated eggs.
Data collected by S. Austad is sufficient to consider
the mating combat of male bowl and doily spiders as a
two-person game with outcome probabilities (3):
~Ω = (0.0, 0.165, 0.165, 0.67), (8)
and payoffs (1):
~W = (R = 1, S = 0.34, T = 1.66, P = 0), (9)
see Appendix VII. The main aims of this study is un-
derstanding the link between (8) and (9) together with
implications for information exchange between the spi-
ders.
In this article, we show that complex strategies are
marginalized (7) by equalizer strategies, rather than by
a general memory-one strategy. Thus, under specific cir-
cumstances, the analysis of equalizer strategies suffice to
predict the outcomes of a combat. Outcome probabilities
~Ω of a combat between bowl and doily spiders (8) corre-
spond to a unique equalizer strategy: for each payoff ~W
of conflict escalation type there exists a single equalizer
strategy sEQnoCCM1 with no mutual cooperation in a com-
petition between two strategies of this type (ΩCC = 0 in
~Ω(sEQnoCCM1 , s
EQnoCC
M1
), see (3)). In addition, the strat-
egy sEQnoCCM1 does not assess opponent’s state informa-
tion and, therefore, corresponds to self assessment.
The standard approach to calculate the statistics of
outcomes ~Ω (3) as a function of the payoffs W requires
us to choose a game, then to guess a set of the rel-
evant strategies {h}, to find an evolutionarily stable
strategy[27] (ESS) hESS as a function of the payoffs
~W , and finally to calculate the outcome probabilities
~Ω(hESS , hESS). The ESS strategy adopted by all mem-
bers of a population hinders the survival of any mutant.
Along this work, we adopt the first condition for an ESS:
a strategy hESS is the ESS if its gain G(hESS , hESS) (2)
is greater than the gain of any mutant m in a competition
against hESS :
G(hESS , hESS) > G(m,hESS). (10)
We assume that the mutants are close to the hosts m ≈ h.
The first condition for ESS (10) is consistent with strict
Nash equilibrium. There are other definitions of ESS[27],
and there are games without ESS[10].
Prediction of outcome probabilities ~ΩEQ =
~Ω(sEQnoCCM1 , s
EQnoCC
M1
) with the help of equalizer
strategies bypasses the calculation of the ESS of a
strategy space {h}. As we will show, there exists a
strategy space that predicts an evolutionarily stable
strategy hESS with the same outcome probabilities
~Ω(hESS , hESS) = ~Ω(sEQnoCCM1 , s
EQnoCC
M1
) as an equalizer
strategy sEQnoCCM1 . We will discuss whether it is possible
to refute the strategy spaces that predict other than
~ΩEQ outcome probabilities.
3There is empirical evidence that some species imple-
ment self-assessment: they use only information regard-
ing their own state, rather than the state of the competi-
tor, to decide whether to flee or keep fighting for a ter-
ritory or mating opportunity[28–35]. There is evidence
for the existence of a significant variety of assessment
techniques in animal contests[6, 36–42], for a review, see
[3–5]. The question exploring the conditions that favor
the evolution of self-assessment during combat remains
to be open.
Memory-one strategies make possible to estimate in-
formation transfer between the players. On the intuitive
level, an iterated strategy can be reactive it may depend
only on the opponent’s state pCC = pDC , pCD = pDD
[15, 43]. In analogy with self-assessment, one can define
the passive iterated strategy as:
pCC = pCD, pDC = pDD, (11)
that is independent of the opponent’s state.
Reduction of a strategy to an equalizer memory-one
strategy by marginalization makes possible calculation
of information exchange, rather than shared information,
between the players. Mutual information I is a measure
of available information about the state of a player under
condition that the state of its opponents is known:
I =
∑
xy=C,D
Ωxy log
Ωxy
(ΩxC + ΩxD)(ΩCy + ΩDy)
, (12)
where Ωxy are the components of the outcome proba-
bilities ~Ω (3). Mutual information is used to describe
total flow of information between living organisms[44] or
an evolving organism and its environment[45, 46]. It in-
cludes all shared information and, therefore, in the case
of two competing players, consists of assessment and an-
other information that is available on the opponent.
Formally, transfer entropy is a measure of information
transfer[47]. Information transfer between two memory
one strategies i and j (following adaptation of eq. (4) of
[47] for memory one strategies) is:
T (i← j) =
∑
x′xy=C,D
Ωxypx′|xy log
px′|xy
px′|x
, (13)
where xy is outcome of round N while x′ is the role of
the first player from round N + 1. Thus the probabilities
px′|xy constitute a memory-one strategy (4). Conditional
probability px′|x for a player to be in state x′ at the round
N + 1 if its state was x at the round N is:
px′|x = px′|xCfxC + px′|xDfxD, fxy =
Ωxy
ΩxC + ΩxD
. (14)
Transfer entropy is asymmetric: eq. (13) corresponds to
assessment of j’s state by the strategy i. Passive strate-
gies (11) vanish transfer entropy and, therefore, lack as-
sessment of the opponent’s state.
For all conflict escalation contests, a unique equalizer
strategy without mutual cooperation sEQnoCCM1 is a pas-
sive strategy (11). This finding, to the best of our knowl-
edge, is the first theoretical evidence for self-assessment
in iterated two person games. It corroborates the as-
sumptions of self assessment in the previous studies, for
instance war of attrition model[27, 29, 48–52].
Self-assessment is a core assumption of the war of attri-
tion model[29]. This model is very important because its
modifications constitute the main method to describe an-
imal contests without repeated rounds[50, 51]. The war
of attrition based models are used to fit the observed data
of real fights between specimens of a species[53], though
some alternative views exist[54].
According to war of attrition, two players engage in a
fight. They choose times t1 and t2 to stay in the fight
randomly according to probability distributions p1(t) and
p2(t), respectively. The winner receives prize V , which
is independent of time. The cost of fight as a function
of time is g(t), where g(t) is a monotonic function of
time in the units of V (linear dependence on time is a
common choice). Payoffs of the winner and the less for-
tunate opponent in a fight with duration t are V − g(t)
and −g(t), respectively. War of attrition with the cost of
fight rising linearly with time predicts the fight duration
that decreases exponentially with time. War of attrition,
like the snowdrift game, is a conflict escalation contest:
the escalation of the fight for a long duration t results in
minimal payoff for each player.
In the case of symmetric contests, there are two pos-
sible modifications of the war of attrition model as is
presented in the previous paragraph. For instance, S.
Austad[26] demonstrated that the data on bowl and doily
spiders fit the war of attrition model with deviations.
The distribution of fight duration across spiders of the
same size, contrary to the predictions of the model, does
not decay exponentially with time. This discrepancy
indicates either a deviation from the war of attrition
model’s central assumption of no state assessment of the
opponent[29, 36, 55] or the cost of fight rising non-linearly
with time[51]. The application of iterated strategies sup-
ports the war of attrition model with self-assessment and
with non-linear cost of fight as a function of time.
This work proceeds with the prediction of unique val-
ues for outcome probabilities (3) as a function of the evo-
lutionary payoffs (1) and justification of self-assessment
for conflict escalation contests, for instance the snowdrift
game. The limitations of the findings and their implica-
tions are discussed at the end of the article.
II. METHODS/RESULTS
Let us show that for an arbitrary two-parameter strat-
egy hK a corresponding equalizer strategy s
EQ
M1
may exist
such that probabilities of the outcomes Ω(hK ,mk) are
identical to probabilities of the outcomes Ω(sEQM1 , sM1),
where hK is a function of two parameters hK(p1, p2),
4FIG. 1: Competitions of an arbitrary two-parameter strat-
egy h(p1, p2) with its near-mutants m ≈ h may generate the
same outcome probabilities ~Ω(m,h) as the competitions of an
equalizer strategy sEQM1 with other memory-one strategies. In
linear approximation, vectors ~pi1 and ~pi2 define a plane (~pi1, ~pi2)
in the space ~Ω for outcome probabilities ~Ω(m,h). An equal-
izer strategy with payoffs ~W ′ ∝ ~pi1 × ~pi2 and other memory-
one strategies generates outcome probabilities in the form of
a plane (yellow) that is parallel to (~pi1, ~pi2). These two planes
coincide if ΩM1(s
EQ
M1
(W ′), sEQM1 (W
′)) = Ω(h, h).
mK ≈ h and sM1 is a memory-one strategy (not neces-
sarily an equalizer one).
The probability of the outcomes ~Ω =
(ΩCC ,ΩCD,ΩDC ,ΩDD) and the corresponding pay-
offs ~W = (R,S, T, P ), despite having four components,
are three-dimensional vectors:
~Ω = (ΩCC ,ΩCD,ΩDC),
~W = (1, S, T ). (15)
The vector of probabilities ~Ω has three independent pa-
rameters because ΩCC + ΩCD + ΩDC + ΩDD = 1. Trans-
formation:
~W →
~W − P
R− P = (1, S, T, 0), (16)
changes gain G → G/(R − P )− P/(R − P ) for all com-
petitors. Thus, transformation (16) does not affect the
relative gains (13) and, therefore, does not affect the ESS
condition (10). Using (16), the average gain of player p
against a player q is:
G(p, q) = (17)
1× ΩCC + S × ΩCD + T × ΩDC + 0× ΩDD = ~W~Ω,
where ~Ω and ~W are defined by (15). The equalizer strate-
gies (5) remain unaffected by the transformation (16).
The outcome probabilities ~Ω(sM1 , s
EQ
M1
) of the com-
petitions between an equalizer strategy sEQM1 and other
memory-one strategies sM1 form a two-dimensional plane
in the three-dimensional space ~Ω (15), see Figure 1. All
strategies sM1 possess the same payoff against an equal-
izer strategy sEQM1 . Following (6) and (2), G(sM1 , s
EQ
M1
) =
~Ω(sM1 , s
EQ
M1
) · ~W = const. Thus, ~Ω(sM1 , sEQM1 ) forms a
plane that is perpendicular to ~W and passes the point
~Ω(sEQM1 , s
EQ
M1
): ~Ω(sM1 , s
EQ
M1
) = ~Ω(sEQM1 , s
EQ
M1
) + ∆~Ω and
∆~Ω · ~W = 0.
For an arbitrary strategy hK = (p
h
1 , p
h
2 ), the linear ex-
pansion of outcome probabilities ~ΩK(p
m
1 , p
m
2 , p
h
1 , p
h
2 ) be-
tween hK and its mutants mK = (p
m
1 , p
m
2 ) defines a plane
in the ~Ω space:
~∆Ω(m,h) = (18)
~ΩK(p
m
1 , p
m
2 , p
h
1 , p
h
2 )− ~ΩK(ph1 , ph2 , ph1 , ph2 ) =
~pi1∆p1 + ~pi2∆p2,
where ~pi1 and ~pi2 are the vectors in the ~Ω space:
~pi1 =
∂~Ω(pm1 , p
m
2 , p1, p2)
∂pm1
∣∣∣∣∣pm1 =ph1
pm2 =p
h
2
,
~pi2 =
∂~Ω(pm1 , p
m
2 , p1, p2)
∂pm2
∣∣∣∣∣pm1 =ph1
pm2 =p
h
2
, (19)
Thus, ~∆Ω(m,h) forms a plane perpendicular to vector
~W ′:
{ ~∆Ω| ~∆Ω · ~W ′ = 0}, (20)
where:
~W ′ ∝ ~pi1 × ~pi2, (21)
see Figure 1.
The planes formed by mutants of hK and the equalizer
strategy sEQM1 coincide if:
ΩM1(s
EQ
M1
(W ′), sEQM1 (W
′)) = ΩK(hK , hK), (22)
where W ′ is defined by (21) and (19). Eq. (22) suggests
that only memory-one strategies depend on the payoffs
(5).
Equalizer strategy sEQM1 (W
′) marginalizes (7) strategy
hK in all competitions between hK and its near mutants
m ≈ hK if both eqs. (21) and (22) hold. If only (22)
holds then sEQM1 (W
′) marginalizes strategy hK only in
the contest against itself.
The payoffs ~W ′ in (21) and (22) may and may not
coincide with the payoffs ~W (16) that define the evolu-
tionary dynamics for the strategies hK . Thus, there are
three possibilities for a solution sEQM1 (hK) to eq. (22).
5FIG. 2: Probability of mutual cooperation ΩCC in a compe-
tition between two identical equalizer strategies (pCC , pDD)
for a snowdrift game. Color map of ΩCC values indicate al-
lowed equalizer strategies. There exists a single competition
without mutual cooperation and valid strategies, see the in-
tersection between the contour line for competitions without
mutual cooperation ΩCC = 0 and the region for valid strate-
gies (line ΩCC = 0.2 is brought to show that only ΩCC = 0
possesses a unique allowed strategy). No mutual coopera-
tion occurs at the strategy (pCC , pDD) = (1, 0)). Proba-
bility ΩCC has a singularity at this strategy and the limits
of outcome probabilities ~Ω depend on the direction of ap-
proach to this point. The arrows indicate different directions
pDD = k(−S + pCCS)/(−1 + S). No mutual cooperation
corresponds to the direction along the left boundary of the
allowed strategies region k = 1. The limit ~Ω without mutual
cooperation fits the observations of the mating combats of
male bowl and doily spiders. The corresponding memory-one
strategy is (pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD) = (1, 1, 0, 0). This memory-
one strategy is passive (pCC = pCD, pDC = pDD). Passive
strategies ignore information about the opponent’s state.
First, there exists a memory-one strategy sEQM1 that fits
eqs. (21) and (22) and:
~W ′ ∝W. (23)
Proportionality of the payoffs ~W ′ and ~W requires:
∇mKG(mK , hK)|mK=hK =
~W · ∇mKΩ(mK , hK)|mK=hK = 0, (24)
Condition (24) holds for some ESS hESSK (10): the first
presentation of equalizer strategies indicated connection
of these strategies to the notion of an ESS[18, 22]. Sec-
ond, eqs. (23) and (22) have a solution and:
~W ′ 6= ~W. (25)
In this case, hK possesses a corresponding equalizer strat-
egy sEQM1 (hK) with payoff W
′ that is incapable of be-
ing justified or explained, because ~W ′ is different from
the observed payoffs. Nevertheless, marginalization ad-
dresses only outcome probabilities ~Ω and therefore pay-
offs ~W ′ can be considered as free parameters of the strat-
egy. This case will be important for the discussion of self-
assessment. Third, eqs. (25) and (22) have no solution
for any ~W ′. In this case, competitions of the strategy
hK with its mutants cannot be marginalized by a single
equalizer strategy.
A
B
FIG. 3: Prisoner’s dilemma: probability of mutual coop-
eration ΩCC as a function of equalizer strategy (pCC , pDD).
Color map of ΩCC values indicates allowed equalizer strate-
gies. A) If S > −T , there are two valid strategies without
mutual cooperation ΩCC = 0. The corresponding probabili-
ties of the outcomes ~Ω = (0, 0, 0, 1) and ~Ω = (0, 0.5, 0.5, 0) are
independent of the payoffs. B) If S < −T , there are no valid
strategies with ΩCC = 0.
For a conflict escalation (0 ≤ S ≤ 1, S ≤ T ): First,
if eq. (22) has a solution for an arbitrary memory-one
strategy sM1 , then this strategy is an equalizer one, see
Appendix V and Appendix VI. Thus, equalizer strate-
gies are unique in their ability to fit interactions of an
arbitrary strategy with its mutants. Second, there ex-
ists a single equalizer strategy sEQnoCCM1 which predicts
no mutual cooperation ΩCC = 0 in the probabilities of
6the outcomes ~Ω(sEQnoCCM1 , s
EQnoCC
M1
):
~Ω(sEQnoCCM1 , s
EQnoCC
M1
) = (0,
S
S + T
,
S
S + T
,
T − S
S + T
),(26)
see Appendix V for a detailed derivation. The graphical
presentation in Figure 2 shows that (26) holds in the
limit:
sEQnoCCM1 = (pCC , pDD)→ (1, 0), (27)
with the corresponding memory-one iterated strategy
sM1
sM1 → (1, 1, 0, 0), (28)
see (5). The outcome probabilities have a singularity in
the limit (27). The limit corresponds to different val-
ues of Ω. Nevertheless, only single Ω lacks mutual co-
operation. Third, the equalizer strategy sEQnoCCM1 (27) is
passive (11). Thus it does not assess information of its
mutants’ states.
Marginalization (22) may be applied only to a two pa-
rameter strategy. Two parameter strategies hK(p1, p2)
suffice to describe outcome probabilities ~Ω. In a com-
petition of two identical strategies hK(p1, p2) there are
two independent outcome probabilities ΩCC and ΩCD
(ΩCD = ΩDC in (15)) and two independent strategy pa-
rameters (p1, p2). Four independent strategy parameters
in a competition of two different strategies hK(p1, p2)
and h′K(p
′
1, p
′
2) even overfit three independent outcome
probabilities (15).
The prediction of outcome probabilities (26) is limited
to a conflict escalation, e.g. the snowdrift game. Equal-
izer strategies in the case of prisoners dilemma payoffs do
not possess outcome probabilities (26), see Figure 3 and
Appendix V.
Probabilities of the outcomes (26) fit the observations
of bowl and doily spiders surprisingly well, see Appendix
VII. By substituting weights (9) for (26) one gets:
~Ω = (0, 0.17, 0.17, 0.66), (29)
which is about 1% close to the values (8) (unfortunately,
no error bars are available). In addition, self-assessment
was assumed in a treatment of bowl and doily spiders
using the war of attrition model.
III. DISCUSSION
The universality of outcome probabilities (26) and pre-
dictions of self-assessment depend on whether any rele-
vant ESS strategy is, necessarily, marginalized (7) by an
equalizer strategy. This question is part of a more general
discussion regarding the relevant strategies to describe
behavior of species during a competition. For instance,
can we refute a strategy that predicts different from (26)
outcome probabilities?
FIG. 4: Snowdrift game: evolutionary stability of the pre-
dicted strategy (S/T, 0) in the (PC|D, PC|C) strategy space.
Adaptive dynamics fluxes (blue arrows) converge to the pre-
dicted state at (S/T, 0) (red point) from the majority of possi-
ble initial coordinates. Continuous region (green dashed line)
of convergence is a property of (PC|D, PC|C) strategy space
without a matching equalizer strategy. The strategy (S/T, 0)
belongs to the subspace of iterated equalizer zero-determinant
strategies (colored region), compare with Figure 2. The col-
ors indicate proximity to the (1, 1, 0, 0) memory-one strategy,
where brown color corresponds to close strategies and blue
color corresponds to distant strategies. Red dashed line cor-
responds to the equalizer strategies in the limit (1, 1, 0, 0), see
red circle in Figure 2. Only the strategy (S/T, 0) lacks mutual
cooperation PC|C = 0.
To support outcome probabilities (26), let us the gen-
eralize the strategies by elimination of H0 in (7). Further
generalization is required because H0 is game-dependent.
The elimination of H0 may lead to the description of the
strategies and the outcome probabilities ~Ω that are game-
independent and, therefore, universal.
To eliminate H0 in (7), let us express the joint outcome
probabilities ~Ω (3) as a function of conditional probabil-
ities PC|D and PC|C . The standard notation of condi-
tional probability PA|B for A under the condition of B
is used. For instance, PC|D is a probability to cooperate
against a defector. A single player’s strategy, then, is:
hK = (PC|D, PC|C). (30)
The conditional probabilities to be D vs. D and to be
C vs D are PD|D = 1 − PC|D and PD|C = 1 − PC|C , re-
spectively. Strategies with conditional probabilities were
used in sequential assessment games (see page 403 of [36])
and in herding models[56].
In a competition of two players i and j, the joint prob-
abilities of the outcomes ~Ω (3) and the conditional prob-
abilities (P iC|D, P
i
C|C) and (P
j
C|D, P
j
C|C) fit the following
7relations:
P iC|C =
ΩCC
ΩDC + ΩCC
, P jC|C =
ΩCC
ΩCD + ΩCC
, (31)
P iC|D =
ΩCD
ΩCD + ΩDD
, P jC|D =
ΩDC
ΩDC + ΩDD
,
This system always has a solution for conditional proba-
bilities as a function of outcome probabilities. Outcome
probabilities can be expressed as a function of the con-
ditional probabilities only under specific circumstances,
because of constraint ΩCC + ΩCD + ΩDC + ΩDD = 0 and
due to omitted causality (who is the first and who is the
second to respond during the competition).
The ESS strategy (30) under the condition of no mu-
tual cooperation (PC|C = 0 for all players) predicts the
same outcome probabilities as can be predicted with the
help of equalizer strategies (26). The solution of (31) if
P iC|C = P
j
CC = 0 is:
ΩCC = 0, (32)
ΩCD =
P iC|D − P iC|DP jC|D
1− P iC|DP jC|D
,
ΩDC =
P jC|D − P jC|DP iC|D
1− P iC|DP jC|D
.
These equations are valid unless there are constraints on
the possible values of conditional probability PC|D.
The corresponding ESS strategy (10):
hESSK = (
S
T
, 0), (33)
follows the substitution of (32) in the gain (17) and solv-
ing (10) for hESS . Finally, the substitution of (33) in
(32) results in the outcome probabilities (26). Thus the
validity of (26) breaks down only if eqs. (32) no longer
hold.
Outcome probabilities (26) are predicted with the help
of equalizer strategies and with the help of strategies (33).
Both derivations assume the lack of mutual cooperation
ΩCC = 0. Releasing this assumption may affect the sta-
bility of the predicted strategy.
To show that general evolutionary stability of (33) and
(26) is possible, let us present an example of a competi-
tion that possesses an evolutionarily stable strategy (33)
even if mutual cooperation ΩCC 6= 0 takes place. We
leave out of the scope of this work all predictions of this
specific example but the stability of (33).
The competition is an iterated two-person game. Dur-
ing a single round of the game, the players are assigned
to be the first (non-rational behavior) and the second
(rational behavior). The first player chooses role D with
probability PD or role C with probability 1−PD, irrespec-
tive of the opponent’s state. The second player chooses
role C with the conditional probability PC|C if the state
of the opponent is C, and chooses role C with the con-
ditional probability PC|D if the opponent is in state D.
Then, the players receive their payoffs (1). The total gain
of a player is defined over multiple rounds of the game,
where each player has equal probabilities to be either the
first or the second.
FIG. 5: Transfer entropy as a function of equalizer strate-
gies and mutual information as a function of (PC|D, PC|C)
strategies. Mutual information (contour lines) includes all
possible channels of information exchange and its processing:
assessment, previous knowledge and external signals. It de-
pends only on the outcome probabilities of the competition.
Transfer entropy (color map) is a measure of information flow
between the players and, therefore, is a better estimate for
assessment of the opponent’s state. It can be calculated only
for memory one strategies, e.g. equalizer strategies. Transfer
entropy vanishes at the strategy (S/T, 0) because correspond-
ing equalizer strategy is passive. Mutual information at the
strategy (S/T, 0) keeps finite value.
To calculate the outcome probabilities (15) as a func-
tion of strategies (30), we assume that probability PD of
a player (30) to be in state D is the same during both ra-
tional and non-rational behavior. This assumption that
the probability distribution of a variable without any ad-
ditional external information (non-rational player does
not know the state of the opponent) should be the same
as its average behavior.
In the case of the snowdrift game (0 < S < 1, T > 1),
Figure 4 demonstrates the relation between the hK strat-
egy space (30) and equalizer memory-one strategies sM1
(4). The colored region covers the K strategies that pos-
sess a corresponding equalizer strategy with the same
probabilities of outcomes (22) for ~W ′ = ~W , see Appendix
VIII eq. (72). Color indicates the distance of the corre-
sponding memory-one strategy from (1, 1, 0, 0) , which is
a unique passive strategy in this space. This strategy
corresponds to the point (33) (red point) with outcome
statistics (26). Indeed, it is a single equalizer strategy
without mutual cooperation PC|C = 0.
The strategy (33) is ESS for the entire range of snow-
drift game payoffs (0 < S < 1, T > 1). The vector flow
in Figure 2 is adaptive dynamics[10] (64) in the K space
8that converges to this strategy (there is an additional re-
gion of convergence (red line) that is specific to the K
space and is, therefore, out of the scope of this work).
The ESS (33) is of the first type (10) which is, in gen-
eral, consistent with the strict Nash equilibrium. It is
important to note that the evolutionary stability of (33)
depends on the assumption of small mutant steps. Con-
dition (24) does not hold for T > 1, but holds for T < 1
when mutual cooperation is better than any type of defec-
tion. Surprisingly, it makes (33) unstable: in this case,
the flux along the PC|C axis changes sign at (33) and,
therefore, a small fluctuation of strategy takes the popu-
lation out of the PC|C = 0 boundary.
The ESS (33) in contests with its near mutants, is
marginalized by equalizer strategy (22) of passive type,
see (11) and (28). The corresponding payoffs (21) are:
~W ′ = (1,
S
S + T
,
T
S + T
), (34)
see Appendix VIII for the details. The payoffs (34) are
different from the payoffs W (16) because condition (24)
does not hold. This result is unique - only an equalizer
strategy can marginalize interactions of a strategy with
its mutants and there is single equalizer strategy with
payoffs (34) that predicts outcome probabilities without
mutual cooperation ΩCC = 0.
Strategy (33) possesses finite mutual information (12)
but zero information transfer (13) calculated with corre-
sponding equalizer strategy (27), see Figure 5. Mutual
information may be finite even in the case of self assess-
ment because self assessment allows some shared infor-
mation. For instance, even during war of attrition with
self assessment a player stops fighting when the oppo-
nents surrenders.
Let us analyze Bowl and Doily spiders with the help of
previous results. Strategy space (30) possesses ESS (33)
and corresponding outcome probabilities (26) in accord
with observations (8) and (9). The ESS strategy (33)
assesses the state of the opponent - a player with this
strategy possesses probability S/T to be C if its opponent
is D. It is impossible without any information regarding
the opponent’s state. Nevertheless, the strategy (33) is
marginalized by the equalizer strategy (28) with payoffs
(34), see Figures 1 and 2. At the limit (28) information
exchange (13) vanishes. Thus we conclude that contest
of bowl and doily spiders includes only self assessment.
To fit the observed distributions of fight durations be-
tween male bowl and doily spiders of the same size (Fig-
ure 6 of [26]) this work supports war of attrition with self
assessment and the non-linear cost of fight. In the case of
bowl and doily spiders, the predicted non-linear cost of
a fight is correlated with the probability of injury during
the fight, see Figure 6 and Appendix IX. This reason-
able results provides additional indirect support for the
approach of this work.
Data of bowl and doily spiders fit outcome probabil-
ities (26) that are predicted by equalizer strategies. As
a consequence it supports validity of eqs. (32) and that
marginalization of the complex strategies by equalizer
ones takes place in nature. Strategy space(30) provides
only an example of a ESS and its marginalization by an
equalizer strategy.
Marginalization of the strategies (7) can be supported
only by experimental results because it does not change
the outcome probabilities (7) and, therefore, does not
affect the gain (2) and corresponding evolutionary sta-
bility. Further attempts to support or refute prediction
of outcome probabilities (26) and self assessment for con-
flict escalation, require more data of animal contests in
the same vein as in S. Austads study on bowl and doily
spiders: contest of two speciments with know outcome
probabilities and evolutionary payoffs. This data is hard
to find, though conflict escalation, snowdrift game[57–59]
or war of attrition, are quite common in nature.
FIG. 6: Normalized cost of fight as a function of time (blue)
multiplied by factor 2 (2g(t)/V ) and the probability of fatal
injury (red) for the combat of male bowl and doily spiders.
The data of probability to suffer a fatal injury is taken accord-
ing to Figure 4 from reference [26] for combatants of similar
size. The cost of fight is calculated from the distribution of
fight duration (Figure 6 of the same reference) with the help
of eq. (82). The probability approaches its maximum value
1 after 200 seconds. Until this time, the probability of fa-
tal injury (red markers) and twice the cost of the fight (blue
markers) fit each other. Factor two corresponds to the proba-
bility that a fight results in an injury of one of the competitors
is twice the probability of a competitor getting an injury.
To conclude, the main result of this work is the pre-
diction of general probabilities for outcomes of a con-
flict escalation contest. The impetus for this study stems
from a finding that there is a single equalizer strategy
for a snowdrift two-person competition without mutual
cooperation. This single strategy predicts observations
of combats between male bowl and doily spiders surpris-
ingly well. In addition, a player using this equalizer strat-
egy does not assess the opponent’s state (self-assessment)
during competitions. This work extends the ability of
iterated strategies to describe non-iterated animal con-
tests, support that evolution reduces complex strategies
to a simpler ones and contributes to the recent line of
9research in making evolutionary predictions by looking
for general unequaled properties of the strategies instead
of a game-specific analysis of evolutionary stability.
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V. APPENDIX A: OUTCOME PROBABILITIES
~Ω OF EQUALIZER STRATEGIES
To calculate probabilities of the outcomes
~ΩM1(~pM1 , ~qM1) = (ΩCC ,ΩCD,ΩDC ,ΩDD) between
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two memory-one strategies ~pM1 = (pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD)
and ~qM1 = (qCC , qCD, qDC , qDD), one finds the station-
ary eigenvector:
M~Ω = ~Ω, (35)
of Markov matrix[16] M :
M(~pM1 , ~qM1) = (36) pCCqCC pCDqDC pDCqCD pDDqDDpCC(1− qCC) pCD(1− qDC) pDC(1− qCD) pDD(1− qDD)(1− pCC)qCC (1− pCD)qDC (1− pDC)qCD (1− pDD)qDD
(1− pCC)(1− qCC) (1− pCD)(1− qDC) (1− pDC)(1− qCD) (1− pDD)(1− qDD)
 ,
between probabilities of the outcomes of the subse-
quent rounds of interaction ΩN = MΩN−1.
The gain G(~p, ~q, ~Wp) of strategy ~p against strategy ~q
is:
G(~p, ~q, ~Wp) = ~Ω(~p, ~q) · ~W, (37)
where ~W = (WCC ,WCD,WDC ,WDD) are the payoffs for
interactions (CC,CD,DC,DD) correspondingly, see (1).
Press and Dyson derived a general formula [19] for the
gains of memory-one strategies ~p and ~q:
αG(~p, ~q) + βG(~q, ~p) + γ = (38)
det
(
MG
(
~p, ~q, α ~Wp + β ~Wq + γ~1
))
det
(
MG
(
~p, ~q,~1
)) ,
where:
MG(~p, ~q, ~Wp) = (39) −1 + pCCqCC −1 + pCC −1 + qCC WCCpCDqDC −1 + pCD qDD WCDpDCqCD pDC −1 + qCD WDC
pDDqDD pDD qDD WDD
 ,
and α ,β and γ are arbitrary numbers.
Zero-determinant strategies ~p fit:
~p = α ~Wp + β ~Wq + γ~1. (40)
In this case, determinant on the right side of the expres-
sion (38) vanish resulting in a linear relation between the
gains of opponents ~p and ~q:
αG(~p, ~q) + βG(~q, ~p) + γ = 0. (41)
Thus, a player can impose specific constraints on the gain
of its opponent by choosing the values of α, β and γ in
(41), and by choosing its strategy ~p to fit (40).
Equalizer strategies (5) correspond to α = 0 in (41). In
this case, strategy p imposes payoff −γ/β on any strategy
~q. Equalizer strategies possess two independent variables
(pCC , pDD). The probabilities pCD and pDC (5) follow
from (40).
Constraints on possible values of the probabilities
in a memory-one strategy 0 ≤ pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD ≤
1 impose boundaries on possible equalizer strategies
(pCC , pDD).
In the case of conflict escalation 0 < S < 1 and S <
T , the boundary of the valid strategies has two linear
segments on the left, see Figure 2. The lower segment is:
pDD =
S(1− pCC)
1− S ,
T − 1
T − S ≤ pCC ≤ 1, (42)
and the upper segment is:
pDD =
1− T + TpCC
T − 1 ,
T − 1
T − S ≤ pCC ≤
2(T − 1)
T
.(43)
The other boundaries of the valid strategies coincide with
boundaries of the strategy space: (2(T−1)T ≤ pCC ≤
1, pDD = 1) and (pCC = 1, 0 ≤ pDD ≤ 1).
In the case of prisoner’s dilemma S < 0, the boundaries
of the valid strategies are either of two types. First, if
S > −T , then there are two left linear segments. The
lower segment is:
pDD =
1− T + TpCC
T − 1 ,
T − 1
T
≤ pCC ≤ 2(T − 1)
T − S ,(44)
and the upper segment is:
pDD =
−1− S + SpCC
S − 1 ,
2(T − 1)
T − S ≤ pCC ≤ 1. (45)
Second, if S < −T , then there is a single left segment:
pDD =
−1− S + SpCC
S − 1 ,
S + 1
S
≤ pCC ≤ 1, (46)
Other boundaries, like in the case of the snowdrift game,
go along the boundaries of the strategy space, see Figure
3.
Following (35), probabilities of interactions between
two identical equalizer strategies (pCC , pDD) are:
ΩCC = pDD(−2(−1 + pCC)S + (47)
pDD(−2 + (3− pCC + pDD)S)− (−1 + pCC − pDD)
(pDD + 2(−1 + pCC − pDD)S)T )/D,
ΩCD = ΩDC = ((−1 + pCC)(1 + pCC − pDD)pDD)/D,
ΩDD = ((−1 + pCC)×(−2pCCpDD + 2p2DD − S + 2pCCS − p2CCS − 3pDDS
+3pCCpDDS − 2p2DDS + (−1 + pCC − pDD)×
(−1 + 2pDD − 2(1 + pDD)S + pCC(−1 + 2S))T )) /D,
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where denominator D is:
D = (−1 + pCC − pDD)× (48)(−(−1 + pCC)2S + pDD(2− (4− 2pCC + pDD)S) + T+
(−2pDD + 2S + (pCC − pDD)(pDD −
2(2 + pDD)S + pCC(−1 + 2S)))T ) .
These expressions may be calculated for any values of
(pCC , pDD) but are valid only within the boundaries (42-
46).
Outcome probabilities Ω as a function of an equalizer
strategy have discontinuity at point (pCC , pDD) = (1, 0).
The limit depends on the path of approach:
pDD = k(−S + pCCS)/(−1 + S), (49)
that depends on parameter 1 ≤ k. If k = 1 then (49) cor-
responds to the lower boundary (42). The corresponding
limits of the outcome probabilities are:
ΩCC =
k(k − 1)S2
(1 + (k − 1)S)(kS + T ) ,
ΩCD = ΩDC =
kS
(1 + (k − 1)S)(kS + T ) ,
ΩDD =
kS(T − 1) + T − ST
(1 + (k − 1)S)(kS + T ) , (50)
Only for k = 1 there exists a single strategy with ΩCC =
0, see Figure 2. This strategy exists for 0 ≤ S ≤ 1
and S ≤ T : from condition ΩCD + ΩDC < 1 follows
that S < T , and from S/(1 − S) > 0 (condition for
the boundary to exist) follows 0 < S < 1. The case
k = 0 occurs in the case of prisoners dilemma and leads
to degenerate ~Ω = (0, 0, 0, 1) (50).
VI. APPENDIX B: IN THE CASE OF THE
SNOWDRIFT GAME, EQUALIZER STRATEGIES
ARE UNIQUE IN THEIR ABILITY TO MATCH
OUTCOME PROBABILITIES BETWEEN AN
ARBITRARY STRATEGY AND ITS MUTANTS
Let us show that, in the case of the snowdrift game, if
(24) holds then p is an equalizer strategy. In this case,
the linear expansion of outcome probabilities in a com-
petition between a memory-one strategy and its near-
mutants form a plane in the Ω space. The plane is per-
pendicular to the payoffs vector W .
First, following (38) with β = 1, α = γ = 0, any equal-
izer strategy fits:
∂G(~q, ~p)
∂qi
∣∣∣∣
~p=~q
= 0, (51)
where index i takes the values CC,CD,DC, or DD. Sec-
ond, assume that ~q is not an equalizer strategy. Then
det
(
MG
(
~p, ~q, ~Wq
))
6= 0 and applying the Jacobi for-
mula for derivative of a determinant, one gets:
∂G(~q, ~p)
∂qi
=
det
(
MG
(
~p, ~q, ~Wq
))
det
(
MG
(
~p, ~q,~1
)) ×
Tr [ −
M−1G
(
~p, ~q,~1
)
det
(
MG
(
~p, ~q,~1
)) ∂MG
(
~p, ~q,~1
)
∂qi
|p=q+
M−1G
(
~p, ~q, ~Wq
) ∂MG (~p, ~q, ~Wq)
∂qi
∣∣∣∣∣∣
p=q
 . (52)
Thus a non-equalizer strategy that fits (51) should vanish
the Tr operator in (52).
The equations (52) constitute a system of cumbersome
non-linear equations that, nevertheless, can be reduced to
three functions pCC(pCD, pDC , pDD), T (pCD, pDC , pDD),
and S(pCD, pDC , pDD). Then, these functions are
scanned numerically for solutions that fit the conditions:
0 <= pCC , pCD, pDC , pDD <= 1, (53)
0 ≤ S ≤ 1,
for the valid values of the probabilities and the payoffs of
the snowdrift game. No solution fits condition (53) for
the snowdrift game 0 < S < 1. For the payoffs other
than the snowdrift game, e.g. prisoner’s dilemma S < 0,
there exist local solutions that fit (53).
VII. APPENDIX C: SPIDERS
S. Austad collected substantial data regarding combat
between male bowl and doily spiders. The data includes
statistics on fatal injuries, the number of eggs in a fe-
male nest, the value of the female nest for a winner and
his less fortunate opponent (by second insemination), the
average lifetime reproductive success, and the duration of
the fights. The ratio of fights that end with a severe in-
jury depends on the difference in the competitors’ sizes:
a smaller spider generally flees from a larger opponent.
This work addresses only the fights between spiders of
similar size.
Let us present the mating combat of bowl and doily
spiders as a two-person game. Each spider decides be-
tween two roles: to flee C or to fight until death D. Un-
der the assumption of a single fight per life, the payoffs
(R,S, T, P ) are:
R =
VF
2
+ Vrest
life
, S = δVF + Vrest
life
,
T = (1− δ)VF + Vrest
life
, P =
VF
2
+
Vrest
life
2
, (54)
where VF is the amount of unfertilized eggs in the fe-
male’s nest, and Vrest
life
is an estimate of the amount of
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eggs to fertilize after the first fight. Payoff R corresponds
to a CC fight where each player gets half of the nest and
all the value of the future amount of eggs. In a CD
competition, D gets T equal to almost the total value of
the nest (1− δ)VF together with the value of the future
amount of eggs, while C gets S equal to δVF by the sec-
ond insemination together with the value of the future
amount of eggs. Payoff P corresponds to DD fight with
equal probability to die and get 0, or get the total value
of the nest together with the value of the future amount
of eggs.
In the case of bowl and doily spiders, the value of pay-
offs (54) can be estimated from the data collected by S.
Austad[26]. The lifetime payoff of a spider without the
fighting cost is VL = 16.2 eggs. The average value of a
female’s nest is VF = 10 eggs. Then, we can estimate
that a spider that manages to flee uninjured from the
first fight can expect VL − VF /2 < Vrest
life
< VL. Thus,
Vrest
life
≈ 13.5 eggs. This value of the future amount of
eggs is in agreement with the previous estimations[60].
The spider that flees from the competitor gets δ ≈ 5% of
the nest value by the second insemination.
Substituting the values from the previous paragraph
to (54) and applying a normalization procedure (16), one
gets (9).
Statistics of the fight outcomes for bowl and doily spi-
ders is estimated as (8). In the case of bowl and doily
spiders[26], 0.67 of the fights between opponents of sim-
ilar sizes result in the death of a participant. Thus
ΩDD = 0.67, taking into account that the death of a
competitor occurs only in a DD type competition, be-
cause both in CD and in DC, the C competitor flees
and, therefore, stays alive. Mutual cooperation CC never
happens ΩCC = 0. Then result (8) follows because
ΩCC + ΩDC + ΩCD + ΩDD = 1 and ΩCD = ΩDC due
to symmetry.
VIII. APPENDIX D: OUTCOME
PROBABILITIES ~Ω OF hK = (PC|D, PC|C)
STRATEGIES
Consider multiple interactions of players i and j with
the strategies (P iC|D, P
i
C|C) and (P
j
C|D, P
j
C|C) (30), re-
spectively. If player i is the first to respond, then, after
N rounds, the average probability P jiD of player j to be
in state D is:
P jiD =
1
N
N∑
k=1
[
(1− P jC|D)δSij(k),D + (1− P jC|C)δSij(k),C
]
,(55)
where Si(k) is the state (C or D) of the player i against
player j in round k and δ is Kronecker delta (δij = 1 if
i = j and δij = 0 if i 6= j).
Following (55), the average probability P ijD of player i
to be in state D is:
1
N
N∑
k=1
δSij(k),D = P
ij
D , (56)
Under the assumption that a player possesses the same
probability to be in state D while responding as the first
or second, eqs. (55) and (56) become:
P jiD = (1− P jC|D)P ijD + (1− P jC|C)(1− P ijD ),
P ijD = (1− P iC|D)P jiD + (1− P iC|C)(1− P jiD ), (57)
The same equations (57) can be justified by symmetry
consideration without addressing multiple interactions.
The system (57) can be solved for P ijD and P
ji
D :
P jiD =
(1− P jC|C)− (1− P iC|C)(P jC|D − P jC|C)
1− (P iC|D − P iC|C)(P jC|D − P jC|C)
. (58)
and
P ijD =
1− P iC|C − (1− P jC|C)(P iC|D − P iC|C)
1− (P iC|D − P iC|C)(P jC|D − P jC|C)
, (59)
where (P iC|D, P
i
C|C) and (P
j
C|D, P
j
C|C) are the strategies
of the competitors.
Here are the probabilities (ΩCC ,ΩCD,ΩDC ,ΩDD) of
interactions of types (CC,CD,DC,DD) between players
i and j under the condition that player i is the first, and
player j is the second to respond:
ΩCC = P
j
C|C(1− P ijD ),ΩCD = (1− P jC|C)(1− P ijD ),
ΩDC = P
ij
DP
j
C|D,ΩDD = P
ij
D (1− P jC|D), (60)
where P jiD and P
ij
D are the probabilities of the players
j and i to be in state D, respectively. If player i is the
second to respond, expressions (60) are valid with a swap
of the indices i↔ j.
The gains (2) of player i are:
Gij1 = P
i
DP
j
C|DT + (1− P jC|C)(1− P iD)S + P jC|C(1− P iD),(61)
if it is the first, and:
Gij2 = P
j
DP
i
C|DS + (1− P iC|C)(1− P jD)T + P iC|C(1− P jD),(62)
if it is the second. Under the condition that a player
possesses equal probabilities to be the second or the first,
the total gain is:
Gij =
Gij1 +G
ij
2
2
, (63)
where Gij is a function of the strategies of both competi-
tors.
Adaptive dynamics formalism is used to find an evolu-
tionarily stable strategy (PESSC|D , P
ESS
C|C ). The population
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is presented as a point in space that moves with velocity
~V = (VPC|D , VPC|C ). The direction and absolute value of
velocity correspond to the optimal gradient of a mutant’s
fitness:
VPC|D =
∂Gij
∂P iC|D
∣∣∣∣∣P iC|D=P jC|D
P iC|C=P
j
C|C
,
VPC|C =
∂Gij
∂P iC|C
∣∣∣∣∣P iC|D=P jC|D
P iC|C=P
j
C|C
, (64)
when mutation steps are assumed to be small. The sta-
ble points of flow field ~V correspond to the ESS states.
It corresponds to condition (10) under the constraint of
small mutation steps.
Adaptive dynamics (64) converges to a steady homoge-
neous population of identical individuals (P iC|D, P
i
C|C) =
(P jC|D, P
j
C|C). In this population, the probability of each
player to be at state D reduces to:
P iiD =
1− P iC|C
1 + P iC|D − P iC|C
, (65)
following (58) and (59). Abundance of state D can take
any value 0 ≤ PD ≤ 1 as a function of a strategy
(PC|D, PC|C).
In the case of the snowdrift game, adaptive dynamics
in space (PC|D, PC|C) is presented as a vector field in
Fig. 4. There are two convergence regions: (33) (marked
by red circle) and the segment (marked by green dashed
line):
PC|C = 1,
, 0 ≤ PC|D ≤ PSD1C|D , (66)
where:
PSD1C|D = (67)
−1 + S + 3T −√9− 10S + S2 − 14T + 6ST + 9T 2
2(−1 + S + T ) .
The first point is an ESS (10). The second segment (66)
is not an ESS as defined by (10) because the gains are
equal for the hosts and the mutants along the boundary
PC|C = 1.
Construction of ~W ′ (21) for strategy (49) results in
(34). The corresponding:
pi1 = (68)− (PC|C − 1)PC|C2(−PC|C + PC|D + 1)2 ,
(PC|C − 1)
(
P 2C|C − PC|CPC|D + PC|C − 2
)
2(PC|C − PC|D + 1)(−PC|C + PC|D + 1)2 ,
(PC|C − 1)
(
P 2C|C − PC|C(PC|D + 1) + 2PC|D
)
2(PC|C − PC|D + 1)(−PC|C + PC|D + 1)2
 ,
and
pi2 = (69) PC|D(PC|D + 1)2(−PC|C + PC|D + 1)2 ,
PC|D
(
−PC|C(PC|D + 1) + P 2C|D + 1
)
2(PC|C − PC|D + 1)(−PC|C + PC|D + 1)2 ,
PC|D
(
−PC|CPC|D + PC|C + P 2C|D − 2PC|D − 1
)
2(PC|C − PC|D + 1)(−PC|C + PC|D + 1)2
 ,
follow substitution of (60) to (19).
ESS (49) is unique for the snowdrift game. Adaptive
dynamics in the case of prisoner’s dilemma possesses two
convergence regions:
PC|C = 0, (70)
PPD1C|C =
−−1 + S − T +
√
9S2 + (1 + T )2 + 2S(−5 + 3T )
2(−1 + S + T ) ,
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when PC|D = 0 and:
PC|D = 0, (71)
PPD2C|D =
−1 + S + 3T −√9− 10S + S2 − 14T + 6ST + 9T 2
2(−1 + S + T ) ,
when PC|C = 1. The first segment is the same as in the
case of the snowdrift game.
A population composed of players with strategies hK =
(PC|D, PC|C) possesses the same statistics of interac-
tions ~Ω as a population composed of equalizer strategies
sEQM1 (pCC , pDD) if:
PC|D = (72)
(1 + pCC − pDD)pDD
(1− pCC + pDD)(pDD(1 + 2S(−1 + T )− 2T ) + T + pCCT + S(−1 + pCC + 2T − 2pCCT )) ,
PC|C =
1 +
(−1 + pCC)(1 + pCC − pDD)
(−1 + pCC − pDD)(−1 + pDDT + S(2 + pDD − 2(1 + pDD)T ) + pCC(−1 + 2ST )) .
This result follows from the solution of (35) for ~Ω and
the definition of hK strategies (31).
Mutual information (12) shared by two identical play-
ers hK = (PC|D, PC|C), following substitution of (60) to
(12), is:
I = log
(1− PC|D)(1−PC|D)PDPPC|DPDC|D (1− PC|C)(1−PC|C)(1−PD)P
PC|C(1−PD)
C|C
PPDD (1− PD)(1−PD)
, (73)
where PD is defined by (65).
IX. APPENDIX E: WAR OF ATTRITION
Let us calculate the ESS of war of attrition following[8,
51]. The first player wins if t1 > t2 with probability:∫
t1>t2
p1(t1)p2(t2)dt1dt2. (74)
Thus, the payoff of the first player is:∫
t1>t2
(V − g(t2))p1(t1)p2(t2)dt1dt2 − (75)∫
t1<t2
g(t1)p1(t1)p2(t2)dt1dt2,
It can be rewritten as:∫ ∞
0
dt1
∫ t1
0
dt2(V − g(t2))p1(t1)p2(t2)− (76)∫ ∞
0
dt1g(t1)
∫ ∞
t1
dt2p1(t1)p2(t2),
Strategy p(t) that slightly deviates from ESS p1 = p+δp1
brings no advantage to the first player if p2 = p:∫ ∞
0
dt1δp1(t1) (77)[∫ t1
0
dt2(V − g(t2))p2(t2)− g(t1)
∫ ∞
t1
dt2p2(t2)
]
= 0,
for any δp1. Following (77):∫ t
0
(V − g(t))p(t)dt− g(t)
∫ ∞
t
p(t)dt = 0. (78)
is the integral equation for the ESS strategy p(t).
The solution of (78) is:
p =
g′
V
exp−g(t)
V
, (79)
where p is the ESS probability to keep fighting at time t.
The probability of a fight to take time T is:
P (T ) = 2p(T )
∫ ∞
T
p(t)dt, (80)
Taking into account (79), the probability (80) becomes:
P (T ) =
2g′
V
exp
−2g
V
, (81)
The probability of fight duration (81) decays exponen-
tially with time t if the cost of fight grows linearly with
time g(t) = Kt.
Sometimes, it is more convenient to work with cumu-
lative probability of fight to take less than time T :∫ T
0
P (t)dt = 1− exp− 2g(T )V . (82)
Both (81) and (82) can be checked against an experi-
ment.
